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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TAX ASPECTS OF THE NOMINEE
CORPORATION: ROCCAFORTE V.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
I. INTRODUCTION
When a property owner uses a nominee corporation' to hold title to
property, the most significant tax question is whether the income gener-
ated by the property will be taxed to the corporation or to the beneficial
owners of the property. The tax problem presented by the use of a nomi-
nee corporation is the structural problem of ownership of the property.2
Generally, it is the "owner" of the property who is entitled to the tax
benefits and burdens of the property.3 When using a nominee corpora-
tion the taxpayer creates ownership problems by splitting ownership be-
tween the nominee corporation and the taxpayer. The nominee
corporation holds naked legal title to property, while the taxpayer retains
The author thanks Professor Ljubomir Nacev for suggesting this topic and reviewing the
manuscript.
1. A nominee is one who holds record title as an agent for the beneficial owner of property.
The terms "nominee corporation," "agent corporation," "shell corporation," or "straw corporation"
typically refer to a corporation that is used for a limited purpose and will, hopefully, not be taxed on
the income generated by the property to which it holds title. An individual, rather than a corpora-
tion, may serve as a nominee, however certain problems exist. One author, using the term "straw"
rather than nominee, explained it as follows:
While an individual may serve as a straw, an individual straw presents these problems:
1. He is not immortal and, therefore, while he avoids title delays on the death of a benefi-
cial owner, his own death may cause problems.
2. Although he may protect the beneficial owner from contract liability, he may incur it
himself.... Bachelorhood is also desirable, otherwise marital difficulties can cause consid-
erable title problems.
These problems are eliminated if the straw is a corporation. A corporation is immortal.
Separate straws can be used for each piece of property, thereby insulating each property
from the liabilities of others. A corporation can be kept impecunious. Its officers can
execute all documents, and officers can easily be changed if necessary.
Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real Estate Transactions, 22 TAx LAw. 647,
647-48 (1969). For an example of an individual serving as nominee see Estate of Smith, 36 T.C.M.
1770 (1977) (individual served as nominee of his wholly-owned corporation).
2. Cliff & Levine, Reflections on Ownership-Sales & Pledges of Installment Obligations, 39
TAx LAw. 37 (1985).
3. Id.
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beneficial ownership.4 Because the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax
upon corporate income, the question is whether the corporation or the
beneficial owner will be taxed on the income from the property. The
beneficial owner usually asserts that the income should not be taxed to
the corporation, but should be passed through to the beneficial owner.
However, the structural problem remains; the corporation holds title to
the property and therefore the income. The income, then, will be taxed
once to the corporation and once when it is passed to the taxpayer. To
avoid the corporate tax, the taxpayer must argue that the taxpayer,
rather than the corporation owns the property. However, the taxpayer
has chosen a corporation as the form in which to do business and, having
chosen, is usually bound by the decision.'
Taxpayers attempting to use nominee corporations have asserted
two theories which allow the income to be attributed to the beneficial
property owners rather than the corporation: the disregard theory and
the nominee theory. Under the disregard theory the property owners,
usually the shareholders, attempt to completely disregard the corpora-
tion for tax purposes.6 The disregard theory is often applied where the
property owners wish to have their wholly-owned corporation disre-
garded for tax purposes. Under the nominee theory the corporation is
recognized for tax purposes, but income from property to which it holds
naked legal title is taxed to the beneficial owners of the property.7 The
corporation asserts that the income is not taxable to it because the corpo-
ration has acted merely as the nominee of the property owners.
In Roccaforte v. Commissioner8 the Tax Court, and later the Fifth
4. Splitting of ownership is common, as in the law of trusts. However, the Internal Revenue
Code is not equipped to deal with the split in ownership when a nominee corporation is created.
5. See Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974)
("while the taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so,
he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not, and may not enjoy
the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to follow but did not") (citations omitted);
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) ("having elected to do some business as a corporation,
[the taxpayer] must accept the tax disadvantages").
6. Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy Is Dead, but the Dead Dummy Should
Livel, 34 TAX L. REV. 213, 223 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. Miller's article presents an
excellent analysis of the forms of ownership of dummy corporations. The identity of ownership is
extremely important for tax purposes. Miller suggests the following distinctions: (1) record owner-
ship; (2) title ownership; (3) substantive law ownership, i.e., an ownership claim enforceable in court;
and (4) common speech ownership, or what a layperson would term ownership. Id. at 216-18.
Although finer distinctions in types of ownership may be drawn, the terms "record title" and "bene-
ficial ownership" will be used for simplicity when discussing Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
7. Miller at 221-23.
8. 77 T.C. 263 (1981), rev'd, 708 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 22:61
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Circuit Court of Appeals, considered the application of these two theo-
ries. The Tax Court found that the corporation in Roccaforte was a true,
nontaxable corporate nominee.' The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court and held that the corporation would be taxed on the income gener-
ated by the property which it held.'0
One year after Roccaforte the Tax Court considered the same issue
in Ourisman v. Commissioner." The Tax Court found that the corpora-
tion in Ourisman was a true, nontaxable nominee.' 2 The Commissioner
appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Ourisman was va-
cated and remanded.'3
This Note examines the current disagreement between the Tax
Court and the Fourth and Fifth Courts of Appeals in light of Roccaforte
and Ourisman. The purpose of this Note is to alert the practitioner to
factors which determine whether a corporation is a true nominee.
II. THE ROCCAFORTE TAx ISSUE
The taxpayers in Roccaforte formed a partnership to develop an
apartment complex. To avoid state usury laws' 4 the partners formed a
corporation to hold record title to the property. 5 By written agreement,
the corporation held only naked legal title to the property, while the ben-
9. Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 287-88. The court stated: "We believe that the entire substance of
the arrangement was one of an agency relationship, and even the form (outside of the corporation's
primary liability on the mortgages) indicated the agency relationship that was intended .... [We
will respect the status of the corporation as an agent of the partnership." Id. (citations omitted).
10. 708 F.2d at 990.
11. 82 T.C. 171 (1984).
12. Id. at 188. The Ourisman court relied on the Roccaforte Tax Court decision in holding that
"the corporation was the agent of the partnership and that the losses generated by the project are
attributable to the partnership and hence to the partners." Id.
13. 760 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit decided Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d
106 (4th Cir. 1986), on August 8, 1986. In Frink, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's
finding that a corporation created to avoid Mississippi usury laws was the agent of a real estate
partnership.
14. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3503 (West 1983) (conventional interest on obligation secured by
a mortgage of immovable property is not to exceed twelve percent per annum). Louisiana exempts
corporations from restrictions on interest rates. Id. § 12:703 (West Supp. 1986) (providing that
corporations may agree to pay interest in excess of the maximum rate allowed in section 9:3503).
Historically, nominee corporations have been used to circumvent state usury laws when financing
was not available at an interest rate permitted to individuals. See Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d
106 (4th Cir. 1986); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12 (1976), af'd, 553 F.2d 94 (1977); Bolger v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Hoffman v. Lee Nasham Motors, 20 N.Y.2d 513, 285 N.Y.S.2d
68, 231 N.E.2d 765 (1967). Taxpayers also have used nominee corporations to facilitate estate plan-
ning, Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844
(1961), or to mask the identity of the true beneficial owners, Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455
(1st Cir. 1971).
15. 77 T.C. at 268.
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eficial ownership of the property remained in the investors. 16
To finance development of the complex the landowners actively
sought investors. The investors and landowners formed the "Glenmore
Manor Apartments Partnership" and began seeking temporary and per-
manent financing for the project. The partnership obtained letters of
commitment for interim financing and for permanent financing. The
permanent financing, however, was contingent upon the project being
structured through a corporation.17
As required by the lender, the partnership formed a corporation to
receive the permanent financing. On the date of incorporation of Glen-
more, Inc., the corporation and all of the partners executed a nominee
agreement in which Glenmore, Inc. agreed to act as nominee for the
partnership.I8 The nominee agreement gave Glenmore, Inc. the "author-
ity to hold legal title to the real estate and to act with respect to the
property in accordance with the owners' written authorization. . .. "I'
The agreement also acknowledged that the beneficial or equitable interest
in the property would remain in the partners. 20 The corporation was not
to receive any fee for acting as nominee for the partnership, but it was to
receive reimbursement for actual expenses incurred in performing serv-
ices for the partnership.21
16. Id.
17. Id. at 266. The agreement provided that either a general partnership, a limited partnership,
or a nominee corporation would be the vehicle for development of the project. Id.
Some taxpayers could use an S corporation to achieve the same tax consequences as a nominee
corporation. However, because most nominee corporations are formed for non-tax reasons, an S
corporation may not achieve the legal relationship desired by the beneficial property owners. Using
an S corporation will not result in the splitting of ownership between legal and equitable title because
an S corporation would have both legal and equitable ownership. Subchapter S Revision Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 and
other scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
18. Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 267.
19. Id. at 268. The parties agreed that Glenmore, Inc. was to hold nothing more than naked
legal title. According to the agreement and the intent of the partners, the equitable ownership never
vested in the corporation. In part, the agreement stated that:
The nominee shall have no authority to and shall not take any action, sign any document,
make any decisions, or do or perform any act whatsoever pertaining to owners' property,
which involves the discretion or judgment of nominee, but shall act, at times, only upon
written consent or authorization of owners expressed and provided in this agreement or
any subsequent direction or authorization.
Id. The corporation also agreed that it would not engage in any business activities except pursuant
to the directions of the owners. Id. at 270. It appears that the stockholders had confused the disre-
gard theory with the nominee theory and were preparing to argue that the corporation had no
existence of its own.
20. Id. at 268. The splitting of legal and equitable title is central to the nominee theory. The
corporation holds only naked legal title to the property while the property owners retain equitable
title.
21. Id. Because the corporation performed services for its shareholders for no fee, the Fifth
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss1/3
TAXATION OF NOMINEE CORPORATIONS
The apartment complex had financial difficulties during subsequent
years, creating net operating losses. After the shareholders claimed
losses from the property on their tax returns, the Commissioner disal-
lowed the losses, stating that the losses belonged to the corporation.22 To
prevent the disallowance the shareholders petitioned the Tax Court.
The Commissioner argued that the losses belonged to the corpora-
tion because it owned the property in question. Therefore, the Commis-
sioner contended, the taxpayers had incorrectly claimed the losses on
their individual tax returns.2 3 The taxpayers argued that the corporation
was a true, non-taxable nominee and that they could properly claim the
losses.
The Tax Court determined that the corporation was a true, non-
taxable nominee for the investors and allowed the losses to pass through
the corporation to the shareholders.24 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the corporation was not a true nominee and reversed the Tax
Court.25 Both courts examined two different views of nominee corpora-
tions: the disregard theory and the nominee theory. Because the courts
reached opposite conclusions, a review of these theories is necessary to an
understanding of the decisions.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOMINEE THEORIES
A. The Disregard Theory
Under the disregard theory, the corporate entity is ignored for tax
purposes and corporate income is passed through to the shareholders,
bypassing the corporate income tax. Disregard of the corporate entity
for tax purposes has usually come at the behest of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to prevent some fraud by the shareholder. z6 Taxpayers
rarely argue for disregard of a corporation, but the nominee corporation
is an exception to this rule. The Internal Revenue Service has, of course,
Circuit determined that the transaction was not at arm's length. Because the transaction was not at
arm's length, the court found that the "agency" of the corporation was dependent upon the owner-
ship of the shareholders. 708 F.2d at 989-90.
22. 77 T.C. at 278. Not only did the federal government disallow the losses, but the State of
Louisiana also made an assessment for additional state income taxes based on the Commissioner's
disallowance of the losses. Id. at 277.
23. The Commissioner maintained that because the corporation was the legal owner of the
assets, it should be responsible for reporting taxable events on its returns. Id. at 278.
24. Id. at 289-90.
25. Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 990.
26. See, eg., Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960), cert denied, 364 U.S. 933
(1961) (income of corporation taxed to shareholder under agency theory and fraud penalty upheld).
19861
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encouraged treatment of the nominee corporation as a separate entity
and as the taxable owner of the property.
1. Moline Properties and the Business Activity Test
Although many cases dealing with nominee corporations were de-
cided before 1943,27 the United States Supreme Court decision in Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner28 is the controlling case concerning the
disregard theory. In Moline, the corporation sought to have its existence
completely ignored for tax purposes and to have the gain on sales of real
property to which it held naked record title treated as the gain of its sole
shareholder.29 The Supreme Court created a business activity test and
determined that Moline Properties could not be disregarded. This busi-
ness activity test remains the rule of law today when a taxpayer attempts
to disregard a corporation.
The taxpayer organized Moline Properties, Inc. in 1928 at the sug-
gestion of the second mortgagee of real estate owned by the taxpayer.
Under the mortgagee's plan, the taxpayer conveyed the property and the
mortgages to the corporation in exchange for all of the stock of the cor-
poration. The taxpayer then transferred the stock to a voting trustee.
The taxpayer remained at all times the sole shareholder of Moline
Properties, Inc.
From 1928 until 1933, when the taxpayer paid the mortgage, a vot-
ing trustee controlled Moline Properties. During those five years, the
corporation had only limited activity. It assumed a financial obligation
that the taxpayer owed to the original creditor. It also defended a con-
demnation proceeding and instituted a suit to remove restrictions im-
posed on the property by a prior deed.
Even after the taxpayer regained control of the corporation its activ-
ity was minimal. The corporation's only activity consisted of the sale of
the property in three parcels in 1934, 1935, and 1936. Although the tax-
27. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co.,
287 U.S. 415 (1932); Palcar Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1942); United
States v. Brager Bldg. & Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941); Sheldon Bldg. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 118 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1941); North Jersey Title Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 898 (3d
Cir. 1936); 112 West 59th St. Corp. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Abrams Sons' Realty
Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 653 (1939); Greenleaf Textile Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A.
737 (1932), afld mem, 65 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1933); Moro Realty Holding Corp. v. Commissioner,
25 B.T.A. 1135 (1932), affid mem, 65 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1933); Stewart Forshay v. Commissioner,
20 B.T.A. 537 (1930).
28. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
29. Iad at 436.
[Vol. 22:61
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payer did not liquidate the corporation, the corporation had no activity
after the last sale in 1936.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court never directly discussed whether
Moline Properties, Inc. or the taxpayer was the owner of the property,
but instead it addressed whether the corporation was an entity which had
a separate existence for tax purposes apart from its owner. The Court
rejected Moline's contention that its existence should be ignored and for-
mulated a "business activity" test to determine whether a corporation
can be ignored for tax purposes. 30 The Court stated that as long as the
purpose of the corporation is equivalent to a business activity, the exist-
ence of the corporation will not be ignored for tax purposes. 31 Because
Moline existed to hold title to real estate, the Court refused to ignore its
existence and determined that the corporation existed to conduct a valid
business activity.32
Moline also attempted to escape the tax by claiming that it was the
taxpayer's agent.33 Moline based this claim solely on the taxpayer's 100
percent ownership of the corporate stock. The Court rejected this argu-
ment because no indication of agency existed other than the normal rela-
tionship between a corporation and its shareholder.34
2. Post-Moline Business Activity Cases
The business activity test created by the Court in Moline has been
widely applied in other tax cases.3" Post-Moline cases interpret Moline
as providing that either a business purpose for the corporation's existence
or a business activity by the corporation will result in recognition for tax
30. Id. passim.
31. Id. at 438-39.
32. Id. The Court stated:
Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of incorporation or
to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or
undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is
followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a
separate taxable entity.
Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 439-40.
34. Id. The Court noted, "There was no actual contract of agency, nor the usual incidents of
an agency relationship." Id.
35. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Raphan v. United States,
759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334
(2d Cir. 1945); Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Strong v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 12 (1976), aft'd, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); Preferred Properties, Inc., 35 T.C.M. 68 (1976);
Daniel E. Rogers, 34 T.C.M. 1254 (1975).
1986]
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purposes.36 The trend is clearly toward recognition of a corporation as a
separate entity if the corporation exists for any business purpose or con-
ducts any business activity. 7
Courts have not read Moline to mean that a valid state-law corpora-
tion can never be disregarded for tax purposes.38 The case of Paymer v.
Commissioner39 illustrates the difficulties that sometimes come from fol-
lowing the Moline business activity approach. The Paymer court held
that a single financing transaction met the Moline business activity test
and prevented the disregard of the corporation for tax purposes.4 °
In Paymer, to prevent attachment of the property by creditors, a
partnership transferred two parcels of income-producing real estate to
two newly organized corporations. The two partners each received one-
half interest in the two corporations. 41 The organizing minutes of the
corporations expressly stated that the corporations received the proper-
ties as mere title holders and that beneficial interest remained in the two
partners.42 After the transfer the corporations had no further meetings
and had neither offices nor bank accounts.43
Although the two corporations were virtually identical, the court
disregarded one corporation for tax purposes, but not the other. Six
years after incorporation, one of the corporations, Raymep, obtained a
36. Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12 (1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); Bolger v.
Commissioner 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
37. See, eg., Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Business activity is
required for recognition of the corporation as a separate taxable entity; the activity may be mini-
mal."); Harrison Property Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 626 (Ct. CI. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1130, rehg denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974) (holding that a corporation will not be
ignored "if it is more than a pure sham and was created or acts for some business end"); Strong v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12, 24 (1976) (corporate activity must be "extremely low" for the corpora-
tion to be ignored).
38. Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Red Carpet Car Wash,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 676 (1980); Minnesota Farm Bureau Securities, Inc. v. United
States, 63-1 USTC 9138 (D.C. Minn. 1962).
39. 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945). The court stated: "We think [the corporation] was active
enough to justify holding that it did engage in business in 1938. The absence of books, records and
offices and the failure to hold corporate meetings are not decisive on that question." Id. at 336.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 336. The corporate minutes stated:
The said conveyance was and is made with the express understanding that the corporation
is only to hold title to the property, the beneficial interest and profits to be in the individual
stockholders and the management and control of the property to be exclusively theirs. It is
understood and agreed that this corporation was only organized for the convenience of the
share-holders in the management thereof.
Id. Paymer is a good example of the court looking to substance over form because the minutes were
only self-serving statements made to allow favorable tax treatment.
43. Id. at 336.
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loan secured by an assignment of all of the lessor's rights in two leases on
the property. Raymep expressly covenanted that it was the sole lessor of
the property. This single transaction was enough to satisfy the business
activity test and prevented the disregard of Raymep.4
The other corporation, Westrich, had no activity after it took title to
the real estate. The Second Circuit held that Westrich was a "passive
dummy" that should be disregarded for tax purposes." The court ig-
nored the minutes of both corporations which stated that the corpora-
tions were taking only record title to the property and that the beneficial
ownership was to remain in the stockholders.46
The distinction the court drew between Raymep and Westrich is an
illogical application of the Moline business activity test. Functionally the
two corporations were the same - they both served the stockholders by
shielding assets from creditors. The single financing transaction by Ray-
mep does not warrant different tax treatment because it did not affect the
functioning of the corporation.
The distinction between the two corporations would be academic in
a case today. Later courts have held that even a business purpose will
meet the Moline test. Today, both corporations would be recognized be-
cause shielding assets from creditors is certainly a business purpose.
B. The Nominee Theory
Even though Moline drastically limited the use of the disregard the-
ory, the nominee theory remains an alternative. Under the nominee the-
ory, the tax impact upon the shareholder and the corporation is the same
as the tax impact under the disregard theory. Under the nominee theory,
the corporation is recognized as a separate taxable entity, but corporate
44. Id. at 337.
45. Id. The corporate minutes did not appear to be mere self-serving documents. The activity
of the corporations was consistent with the purpose stated in minutes. In its discussion of the differ-
ence between the two corporations, the court stated:
The petitioners now contend that Raymep and Westrich were mere 'dummies' which held
legal title to property owned by the two individual petitioners and that both corporations
are to be disregarded for income tax purposes. As a general rule a corporation is a tax-
payer separate and distinct from its stockholders .... [Tihe treasury may disregard the
separate corporate entity where it serves but as a shield against taxation and treat the one
who actually may take the benefit of the income as the owner of the property which pro-
duces it and tax him accordingly .... Westrich, however, was at all times but a passive
dummy which did nothing but take and hold the title to the real estate conveyed to it. It
served no business purpose in connection with the property .... It was but a sham to be
disregarded for tax purposes.
Id. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 336.
1986]
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income attributable to the property flows through the corporation to be
included in the net income of the taxpayer. The income is not attributed
to the corporation because the corporation has merely acted as a nomi-
nee for the beneficial owner of the property. In National Carbide Corpo-
ration v. Commissioner47 the Supreme Court created six tests to
determine whether a corporation is a true nominee of the beneficial own-
ers of the property.48 Instead of using the term nominee the Court used
the term "agent," but the concept is still the same.
In National Carbide the Air Reduction Corporation (Airco) owned
four operating subsidiaries." Airco financed the operations of three of
these subsidiaries under agreements which provided that the subsidiaries
were employed as its agents.5 0 In the agreements, Airco promised to
provide the subsidiaries with certain assets, executive management, and
working capital. The subsidiaries were to pay to Airco all profits in ex-
cess of a six percent return on their corporate stock. The subsidiaries
held only record title to the assets. Airco retained the beneficial owner-
ship of the property.51
Airco argued that the subsidiaries were merely acting as its agents
and that it, not the subsidiaries, was taxable on the amount in excess of
the six percent on the subsidiaries' stock. 2 The Commissioner con-
tended that the subsidiaries were taxable on all of the income. 3 In re-
jecting Airco's argument, the Court determined that the relationship
between Airco and its subsidiaries was merely the result of the share-
holder-corporation relationship and that the subsidiaries were not
Airco's non-taxable agents.54
When reviewing Airco's relationship with its subsidiaries, the Court
found that "[t]he entire earnings of [the subsidiaries] except for trifling
amounts, [were] turned over to Airco not because [Airco] could com-
mand this income if [the subsidiaries] were owned by third persons," but
because Airco dominated the subsidiaries. 5 Airco had not acted at
arm's length with the subsidiaries. The subsidiaries would have com-
manded a much greater fee for the services performed for Airco if they
47. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
48. Id. at 437.
49. Id. at 424.
50. Id. at 424-25 n.1.
51. Id. at 425.
52. Id. at 426.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 433.
55. Id. at 438.
[Vol. 22:61
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had been independent corporations. Although Airco received inexpen-
sive services from its subsidiaries, the small fees prevented the tax treat-
ment that Airco had expected.
However, the opinion did not eliminate the possibility that a corpo-
ration could avoid taxation by acting as the nominee of another. The
Court said: "What we have said does not foreclose a true corporate
agent or trustee from handling the property and income of its owner-
principal without being taxable therefor."56 The Court stated that the
following factors must be considered to determine whether the corpora-
tion is taxable on income generated by the property for which it acts as
agent:
[1] whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account
of the principal; [2] binds the principal by its actions; [3] transmits
money received to the principal; [4] and whether receipt of income is
attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to assets
belonging to the principal are some of the relevant considerations in
determining whether a true agency exists. The court went on to say
that [5] if the corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal
must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal if
such is the case. [6] Its business purpose must be carrying on the nor-
mal activities of an agent.57
This language became the six factors for determining whether a corpora-
tion is a valid nominee corporation.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ROCCAFORTE v COMMISSIONER
A. The Tax Court Decision
In Roccaforte v. Commissioner5 the Tax Court reviewed the claims
of individuals who alleged that a nominee corporation had acted as their
agent with respect to property beneficially owned by them. The court
reviewed the Supreme Court opinion in National Carbide and the six fac-
tors that the Court suggested for determining whether a corporate
agency exists.59
The Tax Court began its analysis in Roccaforte with a review of the
56. Id. at 437.
57. Id. (emphasis added). It must be very clear that the taxpayer and the nominee are dealing
at arm's length to ensure the tax treatment desired. Because of the uncertainties caused by Rocca-
forte and Ourisman in the nominee corporation arena, one author has emphasized the importance of
using an uncontrolled agent. See Falk, Nominees, Dummies and Agents: Is It Time for the Supreme
Court to Take Another Look?, 63 TAxs 725, 729 (1985).
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corporate entity doctrine6° and its relation to the ability of a taxpayer to
disregard the corporate entity and pass income and expenses through a
corporation to the beneficial owner of property. The court reviewed the
doctrine even though the taxpayers had conceded that the corporation
should not be disregarded.61 The court noted that the Supreme Court
had reaffirmed the corporate entity doctrine in Moline Properties62
which precluded the ability of most taxpayers to use the disregard the-
ory. This review served the court by quashing any notion that the court
was attempting to disregard the corporation and it allowed the court to
present its analysis of the National Carbide tests.6
The Tax Court determined that an agency relationship existed be-
tween Glenmore, Inc. and the partnership because Glenmore, Inc. met
four of the six National Carbide factors.6 Glenmore, Inc. operated in
the name of the partnership;6 the actions of Glenmore, Inc. bound the
partnership;66 income received by Glenmore, Inc. was attributable to as-
sets of the partnership; 67and, the activities of Glenmore, Inc. were consis-
tent with the normal duties of an agent.68  The Tax Court did not
consider the third factor, whether the corporation had transmitted the
monies that it received to the partnership, because it was not applicable
due to the ongoing nature of operating an apartment complex.
60. The corporate entity doctrine simply recognized that the corporation has a separate legal
existence from its shareholder.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 279. Despite the fact that Moline is applicable to the facts in Roccaforte, the Tax
Court was careful to avoid indiscriminate application of Moline. The court stated:
The Moline decision is not conclusive with respect to the facts in the instant case. Factual
differences between the two require us to consider further the agency argument. For in-
stance, in Moline, there was neither an agency contract nor did any of the usual incidents
of an agency relationship exist . . . . However, in the instant case, the agency issue is
presented clearly.
Id. (citations omitted).
63. 77 T.C. at 292-93. Even after the court explained that it was not attempting to disregard
the corporation, the dissent still appeared to confuse the disregard theory with the nominee theory.
Id. (Nims, J., dissenting). The dissent stated: "I find it inappropriate to here sanction an end-run
around Moline Properties and its holding that so long as the purpose of incorporation is the
equivalent of business activity, or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the
corporation remains a separate taxable entity." Id. at 291-92. Judge Nims' dissent was misplaced
because the Tax Court clearly was not disregarding the corporation. The Moline business activity
test cited by Nims is applicable only when the corporation is to be disregarded as a separate taxable
entity. The Tax Court's holding that the corporation was the nominee of the beneficial owners Is
inconsistent with Nims' dissent. The Tax Court could not have found that the corporation was a
nominee unless it also recognized that the corporation had a separate existence.
64. Id. at 283-88.
65. Id. at 283-85.
66. Id. at 285-86.
67. Id. at 286.
68. Id. at 287.
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The critical point in the analysis, and the point upon which the Tax
Court was later reversed, was that the Tax Court found Glenmore, Inc.
failed the fifth factor.69 The agency of Glenmore, Inc. depended upon
the partner's ownership of the corporation.70 The partnership clearly
controlled and dominated the corporation. However, because an agent is
always controlled by the principal, that factor alone should not be deter-
minative of whether a true corporate agency exists for tax purposes.71
The investors in the partnership were also the shareholders in the corpo-
ration. Still, the partners' ownership of the corporation did not prevent
Glenmore, Inc. from meeting the fifth test. It was the manner in which
the partners dealt with the corporation that made the agency dependent
on ownership by the partners.72
The Tax Court noted that the partnership had not dealt with the
corporation at arm's length.73 Agents do not normally perform services
gratuitously for their principals. Because the partners had not compen-
sated Glenmore, Inc. for the services that it had performed, the dealings
between the two were not at arm's length. The partners presented no
explanation for the free services other than the ownership of the corpora-
tion. Thus, the court concluded that Glemnore, Inc. served as agent for
the partners only because the partners owned it.
Although the corporation failed to meet the fifth part of the nomi-
nee/agency test, the Tax Court determined that the corporation was a
true non-taxable nominee because the "entire substance" of the arrange-
ment was one of an agency relationship.7 4 The dealings of the corpora-
tion with outside parties indicated the corporation intended that an
agency relationship exist between the corporation and the partnership.
All of the parties that dealt with Glennore, Inc. were aware that it was
merely acting as agent for the partnership. The court also noted that the
partners remained primarily liable on all of the mortgages and liabilities
arising out of the apartment project and did not avail themselves of the
limited liability of the corporate form.75
69. Id. at 286-87.
70. Id. at at 287.
71. Id. at 288. The taxpayers in Roccaforte "were careful to endow the corporation with spe-
cific indicia of an agency relationship." Id. at 287. Among the factors which the Tax Court consid-
ered was that the investors represented to creditors that they, rather than the corporation, were the
true obligors. Id.
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In deciding that the corporation was the non-taxable agent/nominee
of the partnership, the Tax Court considered the reason that the partners
had formed the corporation. The shareholders had incorporated only to
comply with the state's usury laws.76 The partners claimed none of the
traditional benefits available to a corporate shareholder and had not
formed the corporation as a scheme to avoid taxes or liability.
By considering these additional factors, the Tax Court added an ad-
ditional step in the National Carbide analysis; the court looked at the
transaction as a whole. In substance, the partners were the economic
owners of the property with all of the risks and benefits of ownership.
The relationship between Glenmore, Inc. and the partners appeared as if
the partners intended a valid agency to exist. Because the transaction as
a whole seemed to be a proper agency relationship, the court recognized
the agency relationship which the partners had intended. The court
noted that when the indicia of agency are present and the corporation is
formed solely to comply with state usury laws, it would respect the status
of the corporation as agent of the beneficial owners of the property.
B. Roccaforte in the Fifth Circuit
On appeal by the Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit reversed the deci-
sion of the Tax Court in Roccaforte.77 Although the Tax Court looked at
the substance of the entire relationship, the Fifth Circuit determined that
before a corporation can be considered a "true, nontaxable agent" of its
principal, it must meet the fifth and sixth factors of the National Carbide
test. The Fifth Circuit found the fifth factor, that relations with the cor-
poration's principal must not be dependent on the fact that it is owned by
the principal, and the sixth factor, that the business purpose of the corpo-
ration must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent, were
mandatory. The Tax Court had already determined that the agency rela-
tionship between the corporation and its principal was dependent upon
the ownership by the principal.7" All that remained for the Fifth Circuit
to do was to determine whether the Tax Court had properly applied the
law.
The Fifth Circuit Court noted that the Tax Court had interjected a
new idea into the nominee/agent corporation arena by treating all six of
76. See supra note 14.
77. 708 F.2d 986.
78. 77 T.C. at 287.
[Vol. 22:61
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the factors as having equal weight.7 9 In National Carbide, the Supreme
Court stated that "[i]f the corporation is a true agent, its relations with
its principal must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the
principal. . . [and its] business purpose must be the carrying on of the
normal duties of an agent."80 The Fifth Circuit interpreted this language
as making these factors mandatory. By treating all of the factors equally
and then looking at the "entire substance" of the transaction, the Tax
Court had inserted a new factor of chance into an already confusing area.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the notion of looking at the "entire sub-
stance" of the transaction when it determined that the fifth and sixth
factors were mandatory.81 The court based its holding on prior case
law.82 In Collins v. United States,83 individuals formed a corporation for
the same purpose as in Roccaforte, to avoid state usury laws.84 The Fifth
Circuit noted that in Collins it had affirmed the decision of the district
court when the district court did not even mention the first four tests of
National Carbide." Similarly, in Jones v. Commissioner,86 the Fifth Cir-
cuit determined no corporate agency existed when the taxpayers failed to
produce evidence on the fifth and sixth "crucial" factors.87 In the words
of the Roccaforte court, "[t]he fifth and sixth conditions of National Car-
bide are 'crucial' precisely because they are mandatory."88
While consistency in following the interpretation of prior Fifth Cir-
cuit cases was an adequate reason for the Fifth Circuit to overturn the
Tax Court in Roccaforte, the final comments of the court provide the true
rationale for its holding. The court noted that its holding was based on
strong policy considerations concerning closely held corporations.89 The
79. Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 989. The court stated, "While we agree with the Tax Court's fac-
tual determination as to each separate condition, we are forced to reject both its overall assessment
of their relative weights, and its conclusion that GMA was a true corporate agent as that term is
defined in National Carbide." Id.
80. 336 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added).
81. Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 989.
82. Id. at 990.
83. 386 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Ga. 1974), affid., 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975).
84. Id. at 18-19.
85. Roccaforte, 708 F.2d at 990.
86. 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
87. Id. at 754-55.
88. 708 F.2d at 990. The facts of Collins are very similar to those of Roccaforte and Ourisman.
In Collins, a corporation was formed to hold title to an apartment complex. The corporation became
entitled to depreciation allowances, which were claimed by the individual investors. Note, however,
that the facts will never be exactly the same. One court has observed that "it is highly unlikely that
in any two situations the activities and conduct in the name of the corporation will be the same ......
Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1963).
89. 708 F.2d at 990.
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Fifth Circuit noted that, while Moline established that a closely held cor-
poration has a separate taxable existence, such corporations frequently
function as agents for their owners.90 The shareholders should not be
allowed to rely on characteristics common to all corporations in order to
avoid income tax. The court reasoned that to prevent abuse and to main-
tain the integrity of the corporate entity, more than the normal attributes
of agency must be shown. The court decided that the "mandatory" fifth
factor concerning relations with the principal prevents abuse of the cor-
porate entity and helps to maintain its integrity.
C. The Tax Court After Roccaforte
One year after Roccaforte, in Ourisman v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court reaffirmed its position on the National Carbide indicia of agency. 91
The Tax Court disagreed with the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Rocca-
forte interpreting the fifth factor as mandatory.92 On facts which were
almost indistinguishable from Roccaforte, the court determined that the
Ourisman corporation was a non-taxable agent for its principals. 93 As in
Roccaforte, the decision of the Tax Court was overruled; this time the
Tax Court decision was vacated by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.94
The Tax Court applied the National Carbide factors to the facts of
Ourisman as if they were of equal weight, just as it had in Roccaforte.9
As in Roccaforte, the court found that the corporation met all of the
factors except the fifth, because the stockholders of the nominee corpora-
tion were also the beneficial owners of the property. The court deter-
mined that the corporation was the non-taxable agent/nominee of the
beneficial owners because a majority of the indicia of corporate agency
was present.96
The Tax Court disagreed with the way the Fifth Circuit had inter-
preted National Carbide,97 holding that National Carbide did not create
a "factor checklist" and it did not believe the fifth factor was
90. Id.
91. 82 T.C. 171 (1984).
92. Id. at 185.
93. Id. at 187.
94. 760 F.2d at 549.
95. 82 T.C. at 181-85.
96. Because venue for appeal of Ourisman was in either the Fourth Circuit or the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Tax Court was not required to follow the decision of the Fifth Circuit in
Roccaforte. Id. at 185. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affid, 445 F.2d 985 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
97. 82 T.C. at 187.
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mandatory. 98 The Tax Court also found nothing in National Carbide to
indicate that the United States Supreme Court intended that the fifth
factor deny a corporation the status of agent/nominee merely because
the beneficial owners of the property were also the stockholders of the
corporation.99 The Tax Court stated that the fifth factor simply affirmed
the Moline Properties1" principle that the agency relationship must be
proved by evidence other than the control which shareholders automati-
cally possess over the corporation.10' In Ourisman, the taxpayers had
presented other evidence sufficient to convince the Tax Court that the
corporation was the agent of the beneficial owners."0 2 As in Roccaforte,
the court noted that all parties to the transaction were aware that the
corporation was acting as a nominee for the property owners and that the
owners had not used the corporation to avoid the responsibilities of prop-
erty ownership.10 3
Even though both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits focused on the lack
of compensation to the corporation, the Tax Court was not concerned
with the lack of compensation and refused to treat the corporation as the
taxable owner of the property."° The Fifth Circuit saw the lack of com-
pensation from the stockholders as proof of the lack of arm's length deal-
ing between the corporation and the property owners. According to the
Fifth Circuit the lack of arm's length dealing was the main indication
that the corporation could not be considered a non-taxable agent.
The Fourth Circuit vacated Ourisman 105 on the same basis as the
Fifth Circuit reversed Roccaforte. It gave a literal construction to the
language in National Carbide. The Fourth Circuit also found that the
fifth factor was mandatory. As long as the agency relationship depended
upon control of the agent by the principal, the corporation was not con-
sidered the non-taxable agent of the taxpayer, regardless of the presence
of other indicia of agency.
The court noted that it would be difficult for controlled corporations
to satisfy the independence requirement, but that it would not be impos-
sible.106 The main concern of the court was that the relationship be at
98. Id. at 185.
99. Id. at 186.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 173.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 186-87.
105. Ourisman v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 548.
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arm's length.1"7 The court did not specify the amount of evidence re-
quired to make a showing that the agency was at arm's length, but it did
provide a list of criteria that it considered important. One item is the
identity of ownership interest of the principal and agent. 08 The remain-
ing factors are whether the articles of incorporation or the first corporate
resolution specifically limits the corporate purpose to acting only as an
agent for third parties, 109 whether the agent acts for more than one prin-
cipal, whether the agent has entered into a written agency contract which
provides for specific duties and for a reasonable fee,"10 and, whether the
agent actually collects a reasonable fee.' As a matter of law, the court
was unable to determine that any of these factors were present and it held
that the Ourisman corporation was a not a non-taxable agent.
These factors reflect concern by the courts over preserving the integ-
rity of the corporate entity doctrine. In order to preserve the doctrine of
corporate entity, the courts have required the taxpayer to make a greater
showing of agency than that which usually exists between a corporation
and its shareholders. The courts will not give a non-taxable effect to an
agency which is merely consistent with the normal relationship between
the shareholder and corporation. If this greater showing is not required,
the corporate entity becomes only the pocketbook of the shareholder.
The latest decision regarding nominee corporations is Frink v. Com-
missioner."2 Because there was incomplete identity of ownership of the
nominee corporation and a real estate partnership which was the benefi-
cial property owner, the Tax Court distinguished Frink from Ouris-
man."' On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court. 1 4 The
Fourth Circuit found that the lack of identity of ownership interests pro-
vided an insufficient basis for distinguishing Ourisman, and that "[t]he
107. Id.
108. The Fifth Circuit held in Moncrief v. United States, 730 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984), that a
corporation was the true non-taxable agent of the principal when only twenty-five percent of the
corporation was owned by the principal.
109. The articles of incorporation of the corporations in Roccoforte and Ourisman allowed the
corporations to engage in any lawful activity. Roccaforte, 77 T.C. at 267; Ourisman, 82 T.C. at 173-
74. Although the function of the corporation was more narrowly delineated in Ourisman, than in
Roccaforte, the corporation could engage in any business activity related to real estate.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. 1984 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 84,669, rev'd 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986).
113. 1984 T.C.M. (P-H) 84,669 at 2724-25. It is interesting that the Tax Court's decision is a
memorandum decision since memorandum decisions generally apply well-settled legal principles to
the facts. Apparently, the Tax Court will continue its argument until the Supreme Court rules on
the issue.
114. 798 F.2d at 111.
[Vol. 22:61
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principles explained in Ourisman govern this case." '115 Applying Ouris-
man and the mandatory fifth factor from National Carbide, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court's judgment allowing the taxpayers to de-
duct a portion of the corporation's lOSSes. 1 6 The Fourth Circuit indi-
cated in its opinion that the tax treatment desired by the taxpayer could
have been achieved through proper planning.
V. TAX PLANNING
Until the United States Supreme Court speaks once again on the
nominee corporation issue, taxpayers should plan the use of nominee cor-
porations in light of Roccaforte and Ourisman. Even though the Tax
Court may continue to assert its position that the National Carbide crite-
ria should be viewed as a whole, other circuits will likely follow the lead
of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. Unwarranted or not, the question of
whether the agency relationship is dependent upon the ownership of the
principal has become a "super-factor." Under Roccaforte and Ourisman,
the agency relationship question is virtually outcome determinative; it
will overshadow all tax planning.
Ideally, the taxpayer should choose a nominee corporation that is
completely independent of the taxpayer. The further the taxpayer is re-
moved from the ownership of the corporation, the more likely it is that a
court will find that the agency is not dependent upon the ownership of
the principal. One commentator has noted that it is possible to vest own-
ership of the corporation's stock in a law firm or a holding company
organized by the law firm to hold the stock of several nominee corpora-
tions as a service to different clients." 7 Any individual could also own
the stock as long as the individual is completely independent of the
taxpayer. "1
8
115. Id at 109.
116. Id. at 111.
117. 1 B. BITrKER, M. EMORY & W. STRENG, 1 FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS & SHAREHOLDERS: FORMS, at 2-230 (rev. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as BITrKER]. Because
the Bittker forms book was written before Roccaforte, it notes that some taxpayers might wish to
own all of the stock of the nominee corporation. Id. These suggestions should be disregarded. The
authors did note that "absent extremely limited activity, the use of a dummy corporation should
probably be avoided." Id. See also, Falk, Nominees, Dummies & Agents: Is it Time for the Supreme
Court to Take Another Look?, 63 TAXES 725 (1985).
118. The taxpayer's family members, partnerships, and trusts should not hold the stock because
of possible attribution to the taxpayer. Although no section of the Internal Revenue Code specifi-
cally attributes ownership of a nominee corporation's stock to the beneficial property owner, the
principles of attribution are well-recognized in the Code. See eg., I.R.C. § 318 (for specified I.R.C.
sections, ownership of stock is attributed to a taxpayer if stock is held by certain family members,
partnerships, trusts, and closely held corporations). A court would have little trouble attributing
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If an independent nominee corporation cannot be found, the tax-
payer could form a new corporation. As the Ourisman court suggested,
the articles of incorporation should limit the purposes of the corporation
to acting as a nominee for others119 Although National Carbide does not
actually prohibit the beneficial owners from being the stockholders of the
new corporation, as Roccaforte demonstrates, a corporation that is
owned by the beneficial property owners must be dealt with at arm's
length. The nominee corporation must act on behalf of a non-owner in
the same way it acts for its individual owners. The quantum of proof
required to prove arm's length independence is greater when the tax-
payer is also the shareholder.
Regardless of the ownership of the nominee corporation, the tax-
payer should prepare a written agency agreement that specifies the duties
of each party. Although an agency can arise from an oral agreement, a
written document is essential, as a practical matter, to a nominee corpo-
ration. 12 Still, formal designations in an agency agreement are not con-
clusive.1 21 The agreement must provide for an arm's length fee to the
corporation - the same fee an independent agent would receive.
Not only should the taxpayer consider the Roccaforte and Ourisman
decisions in tax planning, but the taxpayer should also consider the im-
pact of recent tax legislation on nominee corporations. The Tax Reform
ownership of stock to a taxpayer if the stock were held by the taxpayer's spouse, partnership, or a
controlled corporation.
119. The Bittker forms book offers the following language for the articles of incorporation:
The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized are: To take and hold title
to real estate, as nominee, on behalf of other corporations, associations, partnerships, or
individuals and not on its own behalf, and to convey the same and perform any incidental
transactions in connection therewith for and on behalf of the corporations, associations,
partnerships and individuals for whom it shall hold title.
BrIrKER at 2-231.
Note that in Paymer the organizing minutes stated that the corporations were taking only rec-
ord title. The Paymer court ignored the minutes. Where the function of a corporation is expressly
limited to that of a nominee, courts will probably respect the articles of incorporation rather than
ignore them as the Paymer court did. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
120. The Bittker forms book contains a "Nominal Titleholder Agreement." The agreement is
adequate except for the fee of $100.00. BrrIXER at 2-233. As Roccaforte and Ourisman illustrate,
the fees which a nominee corporation receives for its services must represent arm's length dealing; a
nominal fee will not be sufficient.
In Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986), an attorney for the lender had sug-
gested that a corporation owned by him hold legal title to the partnership's property for a fee of
$1,000.00. If this course had been followed, there would have been a factual question as to whether
the $1,000.00 represented an arm's length fee. Instead of following this route, the lender insisted
that a separate corporation be formed. The nominee agreement with the corporation did not provide
for compensation. Thus, when the Fourth Circuit applied Ourisman, it found that the corporation
did not meet the fifth National Carbide criterion. Id at 109.
121. Harrison Property Management Co., v. United States, 475 F.2d 623, 627 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(distinguishing Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969)).
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Act of 1986 will affect virtually all taxpayers, including nominee corpora-
tions. The Bill passed by the Senate added limitations on the ability of
taxpayers to use losses and credits from passive activities. 22 Although
the Senate included these provisions to curb certain investments in tax
shelters,1 23 the provisions will affect the deductability of losses and avail-
ability of credits passed from a nominee corporation to beneficial owners
of property.
Generally, the Act provides that deductions from passive trade or
business activities may not be deducted against income from nonpassive
activities, and that credits from passive activities are limited by the tax
allocable to passive activities. An activity is passive if it involves the con-
duct of any trade or business where the taxpayer does not materially
participate in the activity.12 4 The provision applies to individuals, es-
tates, trusts, and personal service corporations. Except for a special rule
which limits the use of passive activity losses against portfolio income of
closely held corporations, the provision does not apply to regular C
corporations.
As a beneficial owner of property held by a nominee corporation, a
taxpayer will be subject to the passive activity rule on losses and credits
passed from the nominee. If the beneficial owner of the property does
not materially participate in the management of the property, then any
losses or credits may only be used to offset income from other passive
activities.12 The owner may not use the losses to offset ordinary income
such as salary or dividend income. The losses and credits are not lost,
but may only be used against income from other passive activities.
The Act contains exceptions to the passive activity rule that will
affect some nominee corporations. The Act implements these exceptions
by defining certain activities as passive or nonpassive without regard for
the material participation of the taxpayer. The term "passive activity"
excludes oil and gas working interests.126 Owners of working interests
may deduct losses and use credits from the working interests to offset
122. Tax Reform Bill of 1986, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1401 (as passed by the Senate
on June 24, 1986)(to be codified at I.R.C. § 469).
123. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM BILL OF 1986, REPORT ON H.R. 3838 at 713-
18 [hereinafter cited as SENATE COMM. REP.]. "MIn order for tax preferences to function as in-
tended, their benefit must be directed primarily to taxpayers with a substantial and bonafide involve-
ment in the activity to which the preferences relate."
124. SENATE COMm. REP. at 719.
125. Of course, these provisions will not affect the pass through of income, only losses and
credits.
126. To be codified at I.R.C. § 469(d)(3). "The term 'passive activity' shall not include any
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nonpassive income even though the owners do not materially participate
in the operation of the properties. 127 This exception should apply to oil
and gas working interests held by a nominee corporation. The beneficial
owner should be able to deduct all losses and use all credits passed from
the nominee without regard to the other type of income of the owner.
While the term "passive activity" excludes oil and gas working interests,
it includes any rental activity whether or not the taxpayer participates in
the activity. 128 Thus, rental losses and credits will always be subject to
the passive activity rules, even when a nominee corporation holds the
properties.
As with any tax act, this Act contains exceptions to the exceptions.
Under the Act, an individual may deduct up to $25,000 per year of pas-
sive activity losses attributable to real estate activities in which the tax-
payer actively participates, regardless of the identity of the offsetting
income. This exception is only available to taxpayers who actively par-
ticipate in the rental activity. 129 Taxpayers using a nominee corporation
to hold title to real estate should be able to use this exception. Nothing
prohibits the beneficial owners from managing the property and thereby
actively participating in the activity. In fact, the nominee only holds title
to the property, and management by the beneficial owners is perfectly in
line with the relationship between the beneficial owners and the nominee.
working interest in any oil or gas property which the taxpayer holds directly or through an entity
which does not limit the liability of the taxpayer with respect to such interest."
The Senate excluded oil and gas working interests because of the current state of the oil and gas
industry which was caused by the world-wide collapse of oil prices. SENATE COMM. REP. at 717.
127. The exception is available only to taxpayers who hold the interest directly or through an
entity which does not limit the liability of the taxpayer. A nominee corporation will not limit the
liability of the taxpayer and should be adequate in that respect.
Of course, one entity that allows the pass through losses is the S corporation. Besides being
limited by the basis rules in the amount of loss that may be passed through, the S corporation may
not be the entity of choice for oil and gas interests because of these new rules regarding limited
liability. A nominee corporation may be superior to an S corporation for oil and gas interests with
respect to this limited liability question.
The language of the Bill states that the exception applies to an entity which "does not limit the
liability of the taxpayer with respect to such interest." Id. The Report of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee indicates that the language refers to "financial risk proportionate to... ownership." SENATE
COMM. REP. at 718. Although this language uses the term "risk," the provision probably does not
refer to the at-risk rules. The report states that the passive activity provison bear no relation to
whether a taxpayer is at-risk. Id. at 717. The language may refer to potential civil liability arising
from acts associated with the oil and gas property. Although a discussion of whether an S corpora-
tion would protect a shareholder from civil liability is outside the scope of this Note, a nominee
corporation would not protect the owners and appears to be the superior choice between the two
entities.
128. To be codified at I.R.C. § 469(d)(1)(B).
129. To be codified at I.R.C. § 469(f).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court is firmly convinced that its position on the National
Carbide criteria is correct. The court will likely continue the same argu-
ment in other circuits. Because the Tax Court's position may not be any
more successful in other circuits than in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,
taxpayers should assume that the fifth National Carbide factor, that rela-
tions with the principal are not dependent on the principal's ownership of
the corporation, is mandatory and order the relationship between the
property owners and the corporation accordingly.
Benjamin H. Hulsey
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